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Is HOBBY LOBBY WORSE FOR RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY THAN SMITH?

ANDREW KOPPELMAN* AND FREDERICK M. GEDICKS**

Imagine a world where religious people are a kind of aristocratic elite
who are entitled to injure non-adherents with impunity - a world which
would "permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."' Employment
Division v. Smith declared that "courting anarchy" in this manner was a
conclusive reason to hold that there is no constitutional right to religious
exemptions from laws of general applicability.2 The Hobby Lobby decision
(by some of the same judges!)3 threatens to bring that world into being.
The Court's implausibly broad reading of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is strange when juxtaposed with its unwillingness to extend
any constitutionalprotection to burdens on religion. The Court is apparently
daunted by the counter-majoritarian difficulty when it is asked to
accommodate religion under the Free Exercise Clause, but it feels free to
run wild when it construes a mere statute.
Smith has been denounced as reflecting a callous indifference to
religious liberty.4 But it now is clear that the decision was not at all the

* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Department of
Philosophy Affiliated Faculty, Northwestern University.
" Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School.
Part III of this paper is adapted from (and a few other parts of the paper draw from) Frederick
Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and
Employee Burdens, 38 Harv. J.L. & Gender 153 (2015). Prof Koppelman found Prof Gedicks's
argument convincing, and they both had some thoughts about its broader implications. Thanks to
Bob Bennett, Simon Lazarus, and Micah Schwartzman for comments and to Tom Berg for helpful
conversations.
1. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), quoting Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879). Regimes of religious exemptions "on demand" are becoming
less hypothetical all the time. See, e.g., H.B. 322 Religious Liberty Recognition & Protection Bill,
2015 Leg., Gen'l Sess. (Utah Feb. 11, 2015) (providing religious exemptions to private parties and
government officials from most state laws), http://le.utah.gov/~2015/bills/static/HBO322.html.
2. Id. at 888.
3. Justice Scalia authored Smith, and Justice Kennedy joined his opinion.
4. See Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32
Cardozo L. Rev. 1815, 1815-16 (2011)(collecting denunciations).

223

224

UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. IX

product of an undervaluing of religious freedom, but only of an
institutionally-based concern with vesting too much unaccountable power
in judges.' Some of the same judges who were in the majority in Smith,
notably Antonin Scalia, have been quite receptive to legislatively crafted
religious accommodations, and they have even been willing to construct
judicially crafted exemptions pursuant to statutory authorization. Hobby
Lobby is an example: the Court fashioned a new exemption for for-profit
businesses that had religious objections to providing insurance for
"emergency contraception," even though that exemption had not been
requested by any of the parties.6
Until Hobby Lobby, it appeared that a new regime was coming into
existence in which courts would accommodate religious liberty when that
could reasonably be done without impairing legitimate state purposes. The
Court has now abruptly lurched into an entirely different regime, one
Congress never intended, in which religion will almost always be
accommodated, even if the consequence is serious injury to non-adherents,
so long as there is some imaginable less restrictive means for protecting
those adherents - and regardless of whether that means is likely to
materialize or not.
The Court is evidently keen to protect religious liberty, but this reading
of the law is a disaster for religious liberty. Religious liberty, according to
the Court's reasoning, could sometimes mean the right to impose severe
burdens on those who do not share one's religious views. If this is now to
be the authoritative meaning of that liberty, then the longstanding, broad
consensus that has historically supported it will inevitably collapse.
I. RFRA BEFORE HOBBY LOBBY

Federal and state legislatures responded to Smith by attempting to
reverse it by statute. Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA), which provides that "Government shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability," unless the Government
"demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."'

5.
See id. at 1820-21.
6. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 281-83 (2014) (holding that government must
extend to closely held business corporations a regulatory accommodation promulgated for
religious nonprofit organizations).
7. 42 U. S. C. §§2000bb- 1(a), (b). One aspect of Hobby Lobby's creative misinterpretation
of the statute we shall not examine here is its nullification of the explicit statutory requirement that
the burden be "substantial." See Frederick Mark Gedicks, RFRA Exemptions and "Substantial"
Burdens: A Theory of Justiciability (unpub. ms. dated Jan. 24, 2015).
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RFRA was invalidated by the Supreme Court as applied to state and local
government (on states' rights grounds),' but continues to apply to federal
action.' Similar protections against state law are given by the federal
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and by
many state constitutions and state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts.10
Why would a legislature want to give religion this kind of special
treatment?
Religious liberty in the United States encompasses action as well as
thought. The First Amendment protects "the free exercise of religion."
Quakers' and Mennonites' objections to participation in war have been
accommodated since Colonial times. Sacramental wine was permitted
during Prohibition. Today the Catholic Church is exempted from
employment discrimination laws when it denies ordination to women. The
question of religious accommodation arises in cases where a law can allow
some exceptions without undermining its purposes. Many laws, such as
military conscription, taxes, environmental regulations, and drug laws will
accomplish their ends even if there is some deviation from the norm they
set forth, so long as that deviation does not become too great. In the context
of such laws, special treatment is sometimes appropriate. Ideally, the law
would accommodate all deep and valuable commitments, but since that is
not an administrable legal category, religion is an appropriate proxy
category for the law to rely upon."
The right to religious accommodation is, however, a peculiar kind of
right. It is sometimes suggested that rights are necessarily trumps against
the ordinary weighing of costs and benefits.1 2 But a right to free exercise, if
it includes any right to accommodation, can only be a right to a certain kind
of weighing, in which religion is treated as a good that should be allowed to
be pursued unless the marginal cost is too high.13 The right is a right to have
that marginal cost considered in individual cases - a favor that is not done

8. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
9. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
10. For a survey, see Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance,
and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 155,
211-12 & nn.368-73 (2004).
11.
See Andrew Koppelman, Proxy Wars: Religion, the Law, and Special Accommodation,
Commonweal (forthcoming 2015); Andrew Koppelman, "Religion" as a Bundle of Legal
Proxies:Reply to Micah Schwartzman, 51 San Diego L. Rev. 1079 (2014); Andrew Koppelman,
Religion's SpecializedSpecialness, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 71 (2013),
lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Koppelman%200n
ine.pdf.
12. The classic citation is Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in Theories of Rights 153
(Jeremy Waldron ed. 1984).
13.
See Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 Wash. U. L. Q.
919, 968-70 (2004).
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for most of those who object to obeying particular laws.14
The argument for giving these judgments to the judiciary is that courts
hear cases one at a time and so are confronted, as legislatures are not, with
concrete situations. Courts are also committed to treat like cases alike.
Legislatures often overlook the impact of rules on minority religious
groups.
If those groups are able to go to court, even with the support of a rule as
vague as the so-called "compelling interest" test, they will sometimes
prevail." Sometimes, but not always. Whatever its formal expression, the
scrutiny given to religiously burdensome government actions prior to Smith
was deferential. 16 Beginning with the birth of the free exercise exemption
regime in 1963 and running to its general demise in 1990,17 the Court
considered at least fourteen exemption claims under the Free Exercise
Clause, but granted only five (four of which involved denial of
unemployment compensation benefits).1" At the time when the Court first
14. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
430-31 (2006) (holding that Government must show not only that it has a compelling interest in
applying a law to the particular religious claimant, and not merely that its interest is compelling in
the abstract).
15. Before Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that there is no right to religious exemptions
from laws of general applicability, free exercise claims had a success rate of 39.5%. Afterward,
that success rate dropped to 28.4%. More importantly, the number of filed claims plunged after
Smith, from 310 decided in the nine-and-a-quarter years before the decision to thirty-eight in the
three-and-a-half years after it. Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb,
which temporarily (until the Supreme Court struck it down in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997)) restored the "compelling interest" test as applied to state laws, success rates rose to
45.2% and the number of filed claims in that three-year period rose to 114, perhaps in response to
the strong legislative signal that courts should take religious impact very seriously. See Amy
Adamczyk, John Wibraniec, & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting
the Effects of Smith andRFRA, 46 J. Church & State 237, 250 tbl. 1 (2004).
16. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict JudicialScrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1271,
1312 (2007) (concluding that the pre-Smith free exercise cases are examples of the weakest
version of strict scrutiny, which "amounts to little more than weighted balancing, with the scales
tipped slightly to favor the protected right"); Stephen Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free
Exercise Clause: Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 N. KY. L. REV. 265, 289 (1982) (describing
pre-Smith scrutiny as asking whether there is "a real, tangible . . non-speculative, non-trivial
injury to a legitimate, substantial state interest"); see also James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on
the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 102 (1991) ("[S]ometimes the government wins and
sometimes the claimant wins.").
17. See Smith, 494 U.S. 872; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
18.
Compare Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990)
(denying religious organization exemption from state taxes on sales of Bibles and other religious
literature); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (denying taxpayers exemption from limit
on tax deduction for donations to their church); Lyng v. NW. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988) (denying Native American claimants relief from government construction of road
on government property deemed sacred by claimants); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342
(1987) (denying Muslim prison inmates exemption necessary for them to meet in weekly
congregational service); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (denying federal welfare benefits
applicant exemption from requirement that he obtain and furnish a social security number for his
daughter); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (denying orthodox Jewish military
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used the term, "strict scrutiny" referred merely to cost/benefit balancing, not
an automatic presumption of invalidity.19 One study has reported that
between 1980 and 1990 the federal appellate courts rejected an astounding
87% of free exercise exemption claims.20 Even under RFRA and its
successor statute, the Religious Land Use and Incarcerated Persons Act, the
federal courts ruled against the claimants over 70% of the time prior to
Hobby Lobby. 21

Even given this limited role for the courts, there are legitimate reasons
to worry about the judiciary engaging in this kind of prudential balancing as
a matter of constitutional right. Any answer the courts arrive at will depend
on a prediction about the effects of accommodation - for example, whether
it is safe to let Sikh boys carry ceremonial daggers in school, or whether
children are harmed by allowing them to miss two years of high school for
religious reasons. If the prediction turns out to be wrong, it will be hard for
a court to say that the meaning of the Constitution has changed.
The regime that RFRA aimed to restore was one in which courts are
instructed by legislatures to balance on a case-by-case basis, but the results
that courts reach can be revisited and overridden by legislatures - and so it
answers the concern about unaccountable judicial power that played such a
prominent role in Smith. Eugene Volokh has observed that this result plays
to the strengths of both courts and legislatures. Courts get to decide, in the
first instance, what to do in concrete instances of hardship, but the ultimate
officer exemption from uniform requirement that would preclude him from wearing yarmulke);
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (denying religious
organization exemption from minimum wage and reporting provisions of Fair Labor Standards
Act); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying Amish employer exemption from
requirement that he pay social security taxes on employees); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971) (denying claimant who religiously objected to "unjust" war rather than all wars
exemption from draft), with Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (granting
unemployment compensation benefits to appellant who refused to work on Sundays at a
temporary retail position due to his sincerely held religious beliefs even though he was not a
member of a recognized religion); Hobbie v. Unemp't Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136
(1987) (granting unemployment compensation benefits to appellant who refused to work on her
Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of id. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (granting
unemployment compensation benefits to appellant who terminated his job because his religious
beliefs forbade him from participating in the production of war materials); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (granting persons resigning or dismissed from employment for religiously
motivated refusals to work on certain days or at certain duties held exempt from "availability for
work" condition for receipt of unemployment benefits); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(granting Amish parents exemption from state law requiring school attendance to age sixteen).
19.
Stephen Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48
AM. J. LEG. HIST. 355 (2006).
20. James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious FreedomRestorationAct: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1416-17 (1992).
21. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, 860, 861 (2006) (surveying fifty-four
statutory and four constitutional cases between 1990 and 2003 that applied strict scrutiny to
government denial of a religious exemption).
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tough calls are governed by the political process. The result is not all that
different from the common-law regimes that already govern issues of
property, contract, and tort, where courts craft rules in response to specific
disputes, but legislatures have the last word.2 2
Thus, when the Court construed RFRA to accommodate a tiny South
American sect's use of hallucinogenic tea, and so to create an exemption
from federal drug laws, it observed that "there is no indication that
Congress, in classifying [the drug at issue], considered the harms posed by
the particular use at issue here-the circumscribed, sacramental use by a
small religious group."2 3 It concluded that "Congress has determined that
courts should strike sensible balances." 24
The state mini-RFRAs have not fared so well. State courts have
construed them so narrowly that they sometimes have no effect at all. 25 But
the Supreme Court appeared determined to do just what Congress had told
it to do-restore the modest balancing test used in the pre-Smith freeexercise cases. Until Hobby Lobby.
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act precisely to
restore the abandoned, deferential pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence, as
the original statute expressly provided, 26 and as its congressional proponents
were at pains to assure RFRA skeptics.2 7

22. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. Rev.
1465 (1999).
23. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432 (2006).
24. Id. at 439.
25.
See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55
S.D. L. Rev. 466 (2010).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) ("[T]he compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal
court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests."); id., § 2000bb(b)(1) (The purpose of RFRA is "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)"); see Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (RFRA "adopted a statutory rule comparable to the
constitutional rule rejected in Smith.").
27. See, e.g., 103 CONG. REC. H2356 (daily ed., May 11, 1993), archived at
http://perma.cc/B63K-AS4Z (describing one purpose of original RFRA bill H.R. 1306 as "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Federal court cases before Employment Division
of Oregon v. Smith"); 103 CONG. REC. S14352 (daily ed., Oct. 26, 1993) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy, D-Mass.), archived at http://perma.cc/C5EW-6J7U ("The amendment we will offer
today is intended to make it clear that the pre-Smith law is applied under the RFRA in determining
whether Government action burden [sic] under the freedom of religion must meet the test."); 103
CONG. REC. S14468 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1933) (remarks of Sen. Feingold, D-Wis.), archived at
http://perma.cc/C5EW-6J7U ("For nearly 20 years the compelling interest standard has proved to
be sufficiently flexible to strike an appropriate balance between the free exercise of religion and
the functions of Government .... ); see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, 1 0 3rd Cong (1993) ("[T]he
[compelling-interest] test generally should not be construed more stringently or more leniently
than it was prior to Smith."); S. Rep. No. 103-111, 10 3rd Cong. 9 (1993) (same).
Michael Paulsen has argued that the best reading of RFRA's legislative history is that
Congress intended to restore only Sherbert and Yoder, the so-called "high-water mark" of
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II. WHAT HOBBY LOBBY DID

RFRA's name and legislative history notwithstanding, the Court has
severed the statute from its pre-Smith antecedents. It rejected the argument
that RFRA "did no more than codify this Court's pre-Smith Free Exercise
Clause precedents."2 8 It thereby converted RFRA from the statutory
restoration of an even-handed balancing test into a doctrinal revolution that
has vested in federal judges the authority to craft a wholly new and
demanding religious exemption jurisprudence.2 9
In some ways, Hobby Lobby was very good news for the women who
would have been deprived of contraception by their employers' choices.3 0
Hobby Lobby claimed, and many lower federal courts agreed, that the
government's interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to contraceptives was
not compelling. Some of those courts said that religious liberty could not be

religious accommodation in the pre-Smith era, and to reject the other less protective pre-Smith
decisions. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S.
Code, 56 MONTANA L. REv. 249, 284 (1995) ("So far as RFRA is concerned, it is as if Lee,
Goldman, Roy, and Hernandez were never decided. The slate has been wiped clean (except, of
course, for Sherbert and Yoder.")).
Professor Paulsen's reading of RFRA's text and legislative history largely rests on
unsupported assertions about political horse-trading within the House and Senate, see id. at 28591, and does not discuss the last-minute amendment limiting RFRA to the accommodation of
"substantial" burdens on religious exercise-offered on the Senate floor by RFRA's principal cosponsors to secure its passage, 139 CONG. REC. S14352-68 (Oct. 26, 1993); id. at S14461-68
(Oct. 27, 1993); see Gedicks, supra note 7, [Pt. I - "Origins of RFRA's 'Substantial'
Burden"](documenting and discussing the substantive significance of this amendment).
Perhaps most important, Paulsen ignores the significance of third-party burdens in analyzing
the leading third-party burden case, United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). Paulsen, supra, at
266-67 (arguing that the accommodation denied in Lee, which would have exempted an Amish
employer from paying Social Security taxes on employees, was indistinguishable from an existing
statutory accommodation exempting the self-employed from paying social security taxes on
themselves); id. at 289 ("It is difficult to square Lee with Yoder in any principled way.").
28. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2772.
29. Others have noted this before us. See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, What Did RFRA
Restore?, Berkley Center Religious Freedom Project, Sept. 11, 2014,
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/cornerstone/hobby-lobby-the-ruling-and-its-implications-forreligious-freedom/responses/what-did-rfra-restore; Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part XVIII
The one (potentially)momentous aspect of Hobby Lobby: Untethering RFRA from free exercise
doctrine, July 6, 2014, Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/07/hobby-lobby-part-xviiione-potentially.html; Micah Schwartzman et al., The New Law ofReligion: Hobby Lobby Rewrites
Religious-FreedomLaw in Ways that Ignore Everything that Came Before, SLATE (July 3, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2014/07/afterhobbylobbythere
is onlyrfraandthat_s_all you need.html, archivedat http://perma.cc/QAR5-368V.
30. One of us emphasized the good news immediately after the decision in Andrew
Koppelman, The Hobby Lobby Decision Was a Victory for Women's Rights, New Republic
Online, June 30, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118488/hobby-lobby-decision-wasvictory-womens-rights. This averted the immediate danger that we called attention to in Frederick
Mark Gedicks and Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby
Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 Vanderbilt L. Rev. En Banc 51 (2014),
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2014/03/Gedicks-and-Koppelman InvisibleWomen.pdf.
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outweighed by a vague, generalized interest in "the promotion of public
health." 3 1 One court was clueless enough to conceptualize the problem as
one of determining the harm to the government if the exemption is
granted.32 In those now superseded decisions, the upshot was that women
who worked for those employers - a lot of women; Hobby Lobby has over
20,000 full time employees - got no coverage.
Women take account of costs when deciding whether to use
contraceptives.33 Had Hobby Lobby been granted the exemption it sought,
thousands of women would have incurred significant out-of-pocket costs or
forgone altogether the contraceptives Hobby Lobby refused to cover if they
could not afford to pay for them. 34 For women who need a particular
contraception option at a particular time, this loss of coverage is a discrete,
focused, and significant harm, especially in emergencies entailing the risk
of pregnancy from coerced sex.
In addition, there are numerous health-related and economic
repercussions associated with the failure to make available the full range of
contraception. For example, pregnancy may be dangerous for women with
serious medical conditions, such as pulmonary hypertension, cyanotic heart
disease, and Marfan Syndrome. 35 The lives of women suffering from these
conditions literally depends on their access to the contraception most
effective for them. Similarly, "there are demonstrated preventive health
benefits from contraceptives relating to conditions other than pregnancy[,]"
which include the prevention of certain cancers, menstrual disorders, and
acne. 36 Again, proper treatment of women suffering from these conditions
depends their access to particular forms of contraception.
The use of contraceptives also reduces the risk of unintended
pregnancies, which comprise nearly half of all pregnancies in the United
States.37 Women with unintended pregnancies are less likely to receive
timely prenatal care, and are more likely to smoke, consume alcohol,
become depressed, experience domestic violence during pregnancy, and

31. E.g., Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1297 (D. Colo. 2012).
32. Monaghan v. Sebelius, 931 F.Supp.2d 794, 809 (E.D.Mich. 2013).
33. See Melissa S. Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Subsidized Contraception, Fertility, and
Sexual Behavior, 91 REV. OF EcON. & STAT. 137 (2009) (decreasing the cost of contraceptives
leads to a higher usage rate which, in turn, decreases the rate of unintended pregnancies).
34. A 2007 study found that 52 percent of women (compared with only 39 percent of men)
failed to fill a prescription, missed a recommended test or treatment, or did not schedule a
necessary specialist appointment because of cost. Sheila D. Rustgi et al., Women at Risk: Why
Many Women Are ForgoingNeeded Health Care, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, May 2009, at 3.
35. Inst. of Med., Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps 103-104
(2011) ("IOM Rep."); Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 79,870, 39,872 (July 2, 2013).
36. 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,872; IOM Rep. at 107.
37. IOM Rep. at 102-03.
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terminate their pregnancies by abortion.3 8 Finally, unintended pregnancies
prevent women from participating in labor and employment markets on an
equal basis with men.39
The Court deflected one of Hobby Lobby's principal claims by
assuming, without deciding, that the government's interest was compelling.
Doubtless some members of the five-judge majority disagreed with that, but
Anthony Kennedy's separate concurrence signaled pretty clearly that he
thought so, and Ruth Ginsburg's dissent, for four justices, was even clearer.
That's a majority of the Justices. So what could have been a disaster for
women's equality suddenly became a victory.
Having assumed a compelling interest, the Court moved on to leastrestrictive burden. It noted that the Obama Administration had crafted a
clever solution for religious nonprofits. Those companies' insurers were
required to provide contraception in separate policies, for free - something
the insurers were happy to do, because even expensive contraception for all
covered women is cheaper than childbirth for a few. The Court's decision
essentially required that the same accommodation be extended to religious
for-profit employers. The Administration is working on new regulations in
order to provide the coverage.
The women will probably get their
contraceptive coverage - though as we explain below, that is not as certain
as the Court evidently thought.
But note the role of contingency and luck in this outcome.
Suppose that the accommodation in question were not one that could be
promulgated by regulation, or that there had been an administration in
power less concerned about delivering contraceptive services to women.
Then the consequence of accommodating Hobby Lobby would have been
that these women would not receive their contraception coverage for the
indefinite future.4 0 The possibility that they might receive the coverage
through some imagined, hypothetical statute would have been enough under
the Court's analysis to deprive them of their statutory entitlement. The
Court's interpretation of RFRA would then have effectively empowered

38. Id.; see also 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,872.
39. See Jennifer J. Frost & Laura Duberstein Lindberg, Reasons for Using Contraception:
Perspectives of US Women Seeking Care at Specialized Family Planning Clinics, 87
CONTRACEPTION 465, 465 (2012) ("Economic analyses have found clear associations between the
availability and diffusion of oral contraceptives particularly among young women, and increases
in U.S. women's education, labor force participation, and average earnings, coupled with a
narrowing in the wage gap between women and men.").
40. In fact, these women still have not received the mandated coverage. Hobby Lobby's
health plan has presumably not offered coverage for the contraceptives to which it objects since
June 27, 2013, when the Tenth Circuit issued the injunction (ultimately affirmed by the Supreme
Court) relieving Hobby Lobby of its obligation to provide emergency contraception under the
mandate. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff'd sub
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).

232

UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. IX

Hobby Lobby to cut off access to contraceptives to its female employees
indefinitely.
The key passage of the Court's decision declared that the "most
straightforward way" of providing coverage "would be for the Government
to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any
women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies
due to their employers' religious objections."4 1 The Court rejected the
claim that "RFRA cannot be used to require creation of entirely new
programs."4 2 Although "[w]e do not doubt that cost may be an important
factor in the least-restrictive-means analysis," it observed that "the cost of
providing the forms of contraceptives at issue in these cases (if not all FDAapproved contraceptives) would be minor when compared with the overall
cost of ACA," which is "more than $1.3 trillion through the next decade."4 3
The less restrictive alternative that the Court proposes here - but did not
have to reach, because of the accident that there was another program
already in existence that it could rely on - is one that could not possibly be
enacted, now or perhaps ever.
Justice Kennedy left considerable doubt whether he was prepared to
follow the Court's least restrictive means dictum. He was skeptical about
"imposition of a whole new program or burden on the Government." 44 In
Hobby Lobby, he declared, there happened to be "an existing, recognized,
workable, and already-implemented framework" 45 for accommodating the
religious objection. This fact "might well suffice to distinguish the instant
cases from many others in which it is more difficult and expensive to
accommodate a governmental program to countless religious claims based
on an alleged statutory right of free exercise." 46 On the other hand, he
joined the majority opinion in full, and he did not make clear in his
concurrence whether the "difficulty" that he would consider in deciding
whether a less-restrictive alternative is "available" would include political

41. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
42. Id. at 2781, quoting Brief for HHS in 13-354, at 15. The Court also noted that "drawing
the line between the 'creation of an entirely new program' and the modification of an existing
program (which RFRA surely allows) would be fraught with problems." The same judges had
however drawn exactly that line in making the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion
optional for the states, thereby depriving millions of people of health insurance. See, Andrew
Koppelman, THE TOUGH LUCK CONSTITUTION AND THE ASSAULT ON HEALTH CARE REFORM
122-29 (2013).
43. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2781. This calculation makes even a multi-million dollar
program look like a trivial burden on the government. It is not clear why the entire ACA budget is
the denominator in terms of which costs are to be calculated. If the determinative number is the
entire set of conceivable government resources, then why not the whole federal budget, or the
gross national product of the United States?
44.
Id. at 2786. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 2787.
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difficulty. Also, when the deciding vote in a Supreme Court decision is cast
by a Justice approaching his eighties, it is wise to consider carefully what
the other four judges are proposing.
Let us consider, then, the political difficulties presented in Hobby
Lobby.
III.

THE POLITICS OF CONTRACEPTION

The Hobby Lobby majority suggested in dicta that RFRA requires the
government to pursue direct distribution or funding of disputed
contraceptives as a less restrictive alternative to imposition of the Mandate
on objecting employers.47 In the majority's view, the Mandate failed strict
scrutiny under RFRA even though it was assumed to further compelling
government interests in promoting women's health and reducing gender
disparities in healthcare costs, because direct government supply of the
contraceptives would afford the same access to contraceptives as the
Mandate without infringing on Hobby Lobby's religious anti-contraception
beliefs.48 The majority found it unnecessary to hold that government
distribution was required, however, because of the existence of the religious
nonprofit "accommodation." This accommodation excuses from the
Mandate those religious nonprofit employers not already categorically
exempted as churches or religious congregations, such as religiously
affiliated hospitals, universities, and social service organizations.49 The
accommodation requires the employer to complete and sign a government
form that lists the religiously objectionable contraceptives that its health
plan will not cover, and then to send the form to its third-party health
insurer or, if self-insured, to its plan administrator."o The employer's health
plan is then relieved of the obligation to cover the contraceptives to which it
objects, which are instead supplied by the insurer or plan administrator at
no additional cost to employees, dependents, or the objecting employer."
Rather than finding that the government was required to supply
objectionable contraceptives directly, therefore, the Court held that it could
47. Id. at 2800 02.
48. Id.
49. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (b) (2013).
50. 45 C.F.R. § 147.13 1(b)(4) (c)(1) (2013). Such organizations may also apparently obtain
the exemption by advising the government of its religious objections by letter. See, Wheaton Coll.
v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014).
51. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c) (2013). In accordance with the Court's suggestion, the
government recently initiated a rulemaking procedure designed to extend the religious nonprofit
exemption to closely held for-profit corporations that object to the Mandate. See, Coverage of
Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51118 (proposed Aug.
27, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). Self-insured
employers fund their own insurance plans, but rarely pay claims or otherwise administer the plans
themselves, contracting instead with the third-party insurance company to act as the "plan
administrator" for the employer.
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extend the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held for-profit
employers who religiously object to the Mandate, as a less restrictive
alternative to imposing the Mandate on such employers.52
A critical premise of the majority opinion, therefore, is that all female
employees and dependents of Hobby Lobby would in fact receive the
mandated contraception coverage if the government were to pursue either
direct government funding of contraceptives to which employers object, or
extension of the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held forprofit businesses.53 In either event, the majority flatly declared, "[t]he effect
of the HHS-created accommodation on the women employed by Hobby
Lobby . . . would be precisely zero," since "these women would still be

entitled to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost-sharing.54
As so often happens when the Court describes aspects of the world with
which it is not familiar, this proposition is true only in theory, and probably
false in fact.
The Accommodation Is Not Costless

Supplying contraceptives is thought to be cost-neutral to third-party
insurers who sell health plans paid for with employer premiums, because
the costs such insurers incur in providing free contraceptives are almost
certainly equal to or less than the prenatal and childbirth expenses they
avoid by facilitating the increased use of contraception." This is not the
case, however, for plan administrators who operate health plans for selfinsured employers; in that case the benefit of childbirth expenses avoided
by contraceptives accrues to the employer who funds the plan rather than
the administrator who runs it. Administrators will thus incur additional

52. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2803 06.
53. The Court reasoned that extension of the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely
held for-profit businesses does not impinge on the plaintiff's religious belief that providing
insurance coverage violates their religion, and it serves HHS's stated interests equally well. Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782-83 ("The principal dissent identifies no reason why this accommodation
would fail to protect the asserted needs of women as effectively as the contraception mandate, and
there is none. Under the accommodation, the plaintiffs' female employees would continue to
receive contraceptive coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-approved contraceptives, and
they would continue to 'face minimal logistical and administrative obstacles,' because their
employers' insurers would be responsible for providing information and coverage.")(quoting id. at
2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); accord, Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2807 (2014)
("Nothing in this interim order affects the ability of the applicant's employees and students to
obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved contraceptives.").
54. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.
55.
Studies have consistently shown that an insurer's cost of covering contraceptives in a
health insurance plan is equal to or less than the cost of the prenatal care and childbirths that
effective use of contraception avoids. See, Frederick Mark Gedicks, WITH RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
FOR ALL: A DEFENSE OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT'S CONTRACEPTION COVERAGE MANDATE, 6
ADVANCE: J. ACS ISSUE GROUPS 135, 145 & n.7 (2012) (summarizing the argument and data on
cost neutrality).
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operating costs from providing contraceptives in the place of objecting
employers, costs that will not be offset by the realization of savings
elsewhere. 5 6
Accordingly, the Mandate originally allowed administrators of selfinsured plans funded by objecting religious nonprofit employers to claim a
credit against the tax paid by administrators and other insurers on individual
policies sold on the healthcare.gov and the various state exchanges, equal to
the additional costs they will incur from providing no-cost contraception to
the employees and dependents of such employers.5 7 in other words, the
contraceptives supplied under the accommodation by plan administrators of
self-insured plans are paid for by the government through a "taxexpenditure"-lower revenues from the tax credit that would otherwise
have gone to fund aspects of the ACA or other government operations.5 1
Extending the Accommodation to For-ProfitsIs Likely to Require More
Funding
The use of tax expenditures to fund the accommodation was not
originally thought to raise significant problems, because it was not expected
to require significant government funding. Religious nonprofit employers
and employees constitute a very small part of the national economy, so the
number of claimants was expected to be correspondingly small. The
percentage of persons employed by all nonprofit businesses is substantially
less than 15% of total employment in the United States, 59 and religious
nonprofit businesses and their employees constitute only a small percentage

56.

See, Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA EXEMPTIONS FROM THE
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGION, 49
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 352 (2014).
57. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg.
39870, 39882-86 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26. C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590; 45
C.F.R. pts. 147, 156).
58. "Tax expenditures" are "revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income. . . ." STAFF OF JT.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2014-2018, at 2 (Comm. Print 2014)
59. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICS OF U.S. BUSINESSES, NAICS SECTORS,
LEGAL FORM OF ORGANIZATION (LFO) (2011), https://www.census.gov/econ/susb/ (on this page,
click on "U.S., NAICS sectors, legal form of organization (LFO)" under the "U.S. and States" list
to view cited statistics) (estimating that 15 million or 13.3% of the total 2010 workforce of
approximately 113 million persons were employed by nonprofit organizations); Lester M.
Salamon et al., Holding the Fort: Nonprofit Employment During a Decade of Turmoil, 39 JOHNS
HOPKINS NONPROFIT BULL. 1, 2 (2012) (reporting that in 2010, nonprofit organizations accounted
for 10.1% of private employment in the United States, amounting to 10.7 million employees);
Molly F. Sherlock & Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., R40919, AN OVERVIEW OF THE
CHARITABLE AND NONPROFIT SECTOR 4 (2009), http://perma.cc/U2EY-DU7B (estimating
nonprofit employment at approximately 10% of the total workforce).
CONTRACEPTION MANDATE:
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of all nonprofit businesses and employees. 6 0
Hobby Lobby upended this expectation. Closely held for-profit
businesses constitute about 90% of all employers in the United States, 61 and
employ between one-half and four-fifths of all employees. 62 Thus,
extending the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held for-profit
businesses, as the Court suggested and the administration proposed in the
wake of Hobby Lobby,63 will expand the universe of potential religious
claimants and affected employees from a very small to a quite large
percentage of all employers and employees.
In light of this dramatic expansion of potential RFRA claimants and
negatively affected employees, it can no longer be assumed that the
required funding will be minimal or otherwise insignificant-to the
contrary, it is likely to require additional funds. Self-insured businesses tend
to be large operations with tens of thousands of employees and covered
dependents-Hobby Lobby funds a self-insured plan, for example, which
covers more than 20,000 employees, plus their covered dependents; the cost
to Hobby Lobby's plan administrator of supplying free contraception to its
female employees and covered female dependents will be significant,

60. Figures showing the proportion of religious nonprofits to all nonprofit businesses are
difficult to find. In the healthcare industry, however, religious nonprofit businesses-e.g.,
religiously affiliated hospitals-constitute approximately 14% of all nonprofit healthcare
businesses. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MISCARRIAGE OF MEDICINE: THE GROWTH OF
CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND THE THREAT OF REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE (2013),
http://perma.cc/5YVN-A2EF. It seems reasonable to assume that the proportion of all religious
nonprofit businesses to all nonprofit businesses is comparable.
61. There are approximately 7 million incorporated businesses in the United States, Venky
Nagar et al., Governance Problems in Closely Held Corporations 1 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), http://perma.cc/386F-SCQ7, of which 90% are thought to be closely held; see also
Jillian Berman, The Hobby Lobby Decision Could Affect Millions of Workers, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 30, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/hobby-lobby-closely-held-n5545064.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/99X9-U4JP; Aaron Blake, A LOT of People Could be Affected by the Supreme
Court's Birth Control Decision-Theoretically, WASH. POST: THE FIX BLOG (June 30, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/06/30/a-lot-of-people-could-be-affectedby-the-supreme-courts-birth-control-decision/, archived at http://perma.cc/N3JR-5PAS; Allison
Griswold,
How Many People Could the Hobby Lobby Ruling Affect?, SLATE (June 30, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/06/30/hobbylobbysupreme_courtruling how ma
ny_people workatcloselyheld corporations.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ASN9-JXB7.
62.
Compare Venky Nagar et al., Governance Problems in Closely Held Corporations 1 (Oct
2009) (unpublished ms.), http://oerna,cc/386F-SCQ7 (estimating that closely held corporations
employ 52% of workforce) with Jillian Berman,
The Hobby Lobby Decision Could Affect Millions of Workers, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/hobby-lobby-closely-held-n_5545064.html (reporting
estimate that such corporations employ 79% of workforce).
63. See, Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 51118 (proposed Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45
C.F.R. pt. 147).
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especially if, as might be expected, they choose IUDs. 4
No one knows how many of these businesses would exercise the option
created by the Supreme Court. The number might be very small. It might
be very large.
In short, expansion of the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely
held corporations might not be feasible without a substantial increase in
government spending. Assertions by RFRA supporters that extending the
accommodation to closely held for-profit business corporations will "cost
the government nothing to implement" are simply wrong.65
CongressIs Unlikely to Approve ContraceptionFunding
Funding for either a substantially larger exchange-tax credit or direct
government funding for contraception is not politically viable, and it is
disingenuous to suggest otherwise. Religious and political conservatives
have been trying to defund federal contraception-coverage programs since
the Reagan administration,6 6 with considerable success: Title X funding, for
example, has been cut nearly in half in real terms since inception of the
program in 1974.67 Many of the same persons and groups are also actively

64. While among the most cost-effective and reliable contraceptives, IUDs have high upfront costs ranging from $500 to $800, in addition to one or more examination fees, which can
range from $75 to $250. Birth Control, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, <http://www.planned
parenthood.org/healthtopics/birth-control-42 11 .htm>.
65. See, e.g., Marc DeGirolami, The Deeper Meaning in the Hobby Lobby Opinion,
LIBRARY OF LAW AND LIBERTY (July 1, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2014/07/01/thedeeper-meaning-in-the-hobby-lobby-opinion/, archivedat http://perma.cc/3JA8-3A2B.
66. See, e.g., Vicki Evans, Taxpayer Funding and Planned Parenthood, U.S. CONF.
CATHOLIC BISHOPS BLOG (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-lifeanddignity/abortion/taxpayer-funding-and-planned-parenthood.cfm, http://perma.cc/Y54N-CCWL
(arguing in support of proposed defunding of Title X); Pam Belluck & Emily Ramshaw, Women
in Texas Losing Options for Health Care in Abortion Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2012,
http://perma.cc/LP4S-FVAK (reporting that all four candidates then remaining in the 2012
Republic primary, including Mitt Romney and Rick Santorum, favored defunding Title X and
eliminating Planned Parenthood access to federal funds); Erik Eckholm, Planned Parenthood
FinancingIs Caught in Budget Feud, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, http://perma.cc/MB9Z-AXBE
(reporting that the Republican-controlled House passed a bill to entirely defund Title X); NAT'L
FAMILY PLAN'G & REPROD. HLTH. Ass'N, THE TURNING PoINT: FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE AND
REGULATORY ACTION ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH IN 2012 6 11 (2012),
http://perma.cc/H95Q-KV96 (reporting Republican efforts to entirely defund Title X, and eventual
cuts to Title X funding); PLANNED PARENTHOOD, TITLE X: AMERICA'S FAMILY PLANNING
PROGRAM, http://perma.cc/WX95-ZYN5; Sarah Kliff, Romney Takes on Family Planning, WASH.
POST: WONKBLOG (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/romney-takes-on-familyplanning/2011/11/04/gIQAQBcrmM blog.html, http://perma.cc/5JSY-BTTW (reporting that
during the 2012 Republican primary Mitt Romney proposed to eliminate Title X funding).
67. See, e.g., Titl X: America's Family Planning Program, PLANNED PARENTHOOD
ADVOCATES OF VA, INC. (2004),

http://www.ppav.org/title x_americas_familyplanning_program (noting that as of February
2001, Title X funding had been reduced to 60% of its inflation-adjusted 1974 funding).Title X of
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committed to defunding the entire ACA,68 and filed amicus briefs in support
of Hobby Lobby's argument that for-profit businesses are entitled to a
RFRA exemption from the Mandate under RFRA.69 These persons and
groups are unlikely to increase funding for Title X, to replace funds lost by
significantly increased claims of the exchange tax credit, or to fund any
other government program designed to supply free contraceptives to female
employees and dependents of for-profit employers exempted from the
Mandate. Unsurprisingly, the aftermath of Hobby Lobby has seen no letup
in conservative efforts to defund Title X and the ACA, and to block or
reduce direct government supply of contraceptives.70 No conservative
person or organization has stepped up to endorse an increase in Title X or
other government funding of contraception to fill the potentially large
contraception coverage gap created by opening the religious nonprofit
accommodation to closely held secular for-profits, and religious
conservatives continue to attack the nonprofit accommodation itself71
Nor could existing programs fill the gap at their current funding level.
Title X, for example, does not cover all forms of contraception. The supply

the Public Health Service Act provides funding for a limited amount of contraceptives to lowerincome women at little or no cost, through family planning organizations like Planned Parenthood.
U.S. Dept. Health & Human Services, Title X Family Planning, http://perma.cc/77YA-X8MP.
68. See, e.g., Lori Montgomery & Philip Rucker, House Passes GOP Spending Plan that
Defunds Obamacare, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2013, http://perma.cc/KS9G-ZXHZ.
69. Amici filing briefs in support of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., were overwhelmingly
composed of Republican members of Congress who are publicly committed to repealing or
defunding the ACA (e.g., Senators Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.), Orin Hatch (RUtah), Mike Lee (R-Utah), Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), and David Vitter (R-La.)); Roman
Catholic, evangelical Protestant, and other religiously conservative clerics, leaders, scholars, and
organizations (e.g., Prof Gerard V. Bradley, the Family Research Council, Prof Richard Garnett,
Dr. Robert George, the National Association of Evangelicals, Dr. Daniel Philpott, the Southern
Baptist Seminary, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops, and Dr. Christopher Wolfe); politically conservative think tanks and public
interest firms (e.g., the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Pacific Legal Foundation, and
the Rutherford Institute); see, generally, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/sebelius-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/E7EB-3QVY (providing links to, inter alia, all amicus briefs filed in support of
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., and other linked cases).
70.
Cf, Republicans Block Bill to Restore Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2014,
http://perma.cc/ZFC6-WZAU (successful filibuster of Senate bill supported by 53 Democrats and
three Republicans that would have expressly excepted contraception mandate from RFRA).
71. See, Thomas C. Berg, RFRA Worked in Hobby Lobby; What's Next?, CORNERSTONE
BLOG (July 2, 2014), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/cornerstone/hobby-lobby-the-rulingand-its-implications-for-religious-freedom/responses/rfra-worked-in-hobby-lobby-what-s-next,
archived at http://perma.cc/FC4P-X7R4 (observing that some religious nonprofits continue to
attack the legality of the accommodation); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise
of Religious Exemptions, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 91 (2015) [flagging this citation, and the
quotation, to be fixed at time of publication] ("Hobby Lobby and others are highly likely to
litigate under RFRA against [extension of the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held
for-profits] if it is ultimately provided. They are likely to assert that they are substantially
burdened by any arrangement that makes them cooperate . . in the provision of coverage.")
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of contraceptives its limited funding permits is similarly limited as it serves
only lower-income women-and, as we have indicated, Hobby Lobby's
social conservative allies have been trying to eliminate it altogether. 2 If the
healthcare plans of Hobby Lobby and other closely held for-profit
businesses were exempted from the Mandate on the theory that their
employees and covered dependents could obtain disputed contraceptives
from family planning organizations receiving Title X grants, it is doubtful
that such organizations could pick up the slack without a significant and
politically improbable increase in Title X funding and expansion of
eligibility requirements.

If direct government contraception coverage or extension of the existing
religious nonprofit accommodation requires additional funding that is
unlikely to be approved, then it cannot reasonably be maintained that either
of these alternatives is truly "available." 7 3 The political realities blocking
government funding of contraception serve as stark reminders that whatever
lawyers or judges might conjure up as hypothetical alternatives, in the real
world where women actually live an increase in Title X or accommodation
funding or the creation of any other such program to fill the gap caused by
RFRA exemptions is politically dead on arrival in Congress. RFRA
exemptions for religiously objecting employers therefore threaten to force
female employees and the covered female dependents of all employees to
pay out of pocket for something that the government has compelling
interests in making available through employer health plans at no additional
cost. The "alternative" to the Mandate proposed by the Hobby Lobby
majority exists only in the imaginations of the Justices who suggested it,7 4
and risks leaving the government unable to advance its admittedly
compelling goals of protecting women's health and reducing gender
disparities in healthcare costs whenever government funding is required.

IV.

THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS POSSIBLE

Smith and Hobby Lobby together show that the Court is far more
72.

Rachel Benson Gold, Title X Three Decades ofAccomplishment, 4 GUTTMACHER REP.

ON PUB. POL'Y 1 (2001), http://perma.cc/H3CB-LJNH.

73.
Cf Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2802 n.26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that "in
context of First Amendment Speech Clause challenge to a content-based speech restriction, courts
must determine 'whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means among available,
effective alternatives"') (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666
(2004)) (emphasis in original).
74. See Lupu, supra note #, at 89 ("It is unlikely in the extreme that Congress will pay for
the various contraceptives to which Hobby Lobby and other firms object on religious grounds, so
this alternative may somehow be theoretically adequate but politically impossible.").
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aggressive in accommodating religion as a matter of statutory interpretation
than it has been as a constitutional matter. The theoretical possibility of
legislative overruling - and of a legislatively crafted less restrictive
alternative - evidently becomes a license for aggressive judicial
policymaking.
Another innovation of Hobby Lobby was the Court's embrace of a less
restrictive alternative that was not proposed by the party seeking the
exemption. Hobby Lobby didn't care at all about women's access to
emergency contraception, and was untroubled that the RFRA exemption it
sought would wholly deny them this coverage. 7 5 The Court devised its
solution on its own. The upshot is that now, when government resists a
religious exemption claim, it will not be enough for it to show that the
alternatives proposed by the claimant are not feasible. It will need to rebut
every imaginable alternative.7 6 As the Court insisted, "If a less restrictive
means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government
must use it." 7 7
Justice Joseph Story, defending the Supreme Court's holding that
Congress has a broad choice of means for carrying out its enumerated
powers,7 8 observed that if a specific exercise of power had to be absolutely
necessary, then some powers could not be exercised at all. One could
always imagine an alternative to whatever the government elects to do.7 9

75. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, at 40, 84, 86, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354 & -356) (suggestions of counsel at oral argument that
women could obtain the coverage denied by Hobby Lobby from a new government program or
Title X).
76. Justice Sotomayor writes, in the more recent religious liberty case of Holt v. Hobbs, that
the Court has not said that "officials must refute every conceivable option." On the contrary, "the
government need not 'do the impossible-refute each and every conceivable alternative regulation
scheme' but need only 'refute the alternative schemes offered by the challenger."' Holt v. Hobbs,
2015 WL 232143 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)(quoting U.S. v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1289 (10th
Cir. 2011). Her reading of present law may be too charitable.
77. Holt v. Hobbs, supra, quoting U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
815 (2000).
78. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
79.
Story wrote:
It will be found, that the operations of the government, upon any of its powers, will
rarely admit of a rigid demonstration of the necessity (in this strict sense) of the
particular means. In most cases, various systems or means may be resorted to, to attain
the same end; and yet, with respect to each, it may be argued, that it is not
constitutional, because it is not indispensable; and the end may be obtained by other
means. The consequence of such reasoning would be, that, as no means could be shown
to be constitutional, none could be adopted. For instance, congress possess the power to
make war, and to raise armies, and incidentally to erect fortifications, and purchase
cannon and ammunition, and other munitions of war. But war may be carried on
without fortifications, cannon, and ammunition. No particular kind of arms can be
shown to be absolutely necessary; because various sorts of arms of different
convenience, power, and utility are, or may be resorted to by different nations. What
then becomes of the power?
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Similarly, when government burdens religion, it will often be possible to
imagine a less restrictive means for accomplishing what government wants,
particularly if that means involves spending money. Even a religious group
that routinely steals money from nonadherents will at least be able to argue
that government could compensate its victims, and if the group is small and
only steals small sums, it can also argue that the cost of doing so will not be
exorbitant. More realistically, this analysis suggests that in United States v.
Lee, the Court should have found that it was a less restrictive alternative for
the government to pay the social security taxes of the objecting Amish
employer-the cost of doing so for the small number of employees
involved was miniscule compare to the vast amount collected and disbursed
annually by the Social Security Administration.
Because the alternative that is the basis for religious accommodation
need not be politically feasible, the consequence of this new interpretation
of the statute will be that in practice, RFRA exemptions will sometimes
impose severe costs upon identifiable and discrete third parties. We have
argued elsewhere that a law that does this violates the Establishment
Clause.so
It is also pertinent that the people who will be harmed by this
interpretation of RFRA are politically powerless minorities. When an
accommodation is deemed not to be the least restrictive means, and some
group is consequently harmed, they will ask the legislature for relief. The
legislature will act or it won't. The class of RFRA victims will be those
who do not have enough political power to persuade the legislature to
expend whatever resources are necessary to enact the alternative
hypothesized by the court. Some of those people, like the women in Hobby
Lobby, will be people whose needs are urgent enough to qualify as
compelling government interests. The Court assumed that those interests
are compelling, but left to the contingencies of politics the question whether
those needs would in fact be met. Had those women found an administration
in power that was less solicitous of their needs - say, one that, like Hobby
Lobby and its social conservative allies, regarded those needs as illegitimate
- then they would have been out of luck. The consequence is not merely that
abstract compelling interests will be neglected. It is that the needs of real
people needs will be neglected. RFRA, as construed by the Court, is an
injury-generating machine that will produce a class of persons who are
harmed, perhaps severely harmed, in order to accommodate the religious

Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, § 1240.
80. Frederick Mark Gedicks and Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption
for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 Vanderbilt L. Rev. En Banc 51
(2014),
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2014/03/Gedicks-and-Koppelman InvisibleWomen.pdf; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca Van Tassell, supra note 56

242

UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. IX

scruples of another, more favored class.
This is a different effect than is usually associated with the less
restrictive means test. That test will sometimes prevent the government
from doing what it is trying to do, but the costs are usually spread across all
of society or a very large group;" they are rarely concentrated on a few
people in the way that the costs of a religious employer exemption can be
concentrated on its nonadherent employees. When the compelling interest
test is applied to suspect classifications, or to laws that infringe on
fundamental rights, the interest being pursued is often an interest shared by
the majority of citizens. Minorities get the same benefits - for example, the
guarantee that health insurance policies will cover basic needs such as
contraception - as the majority that wants them for itself. Justice Scalia has
declared that what keeps government action within "reasonable and humane
limits" is "the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the democratic
majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on
you and me."8 2 John Hart Ely put the same thought this way: equal
protection works by "tying the interests of those without political power to
the interests of those with it," forbidding representatives from "sever[ing] a
majority coalition's interests from those of various minorities."83 RFRA, as
construed by the Court, accomplishes that severing. Had the Obama
Administration not acted, the affected women were too small a group to
secure political relief. And that would have been that.
The suspect-classification doctrine exists in order to bar government
from pursuing illegitimate purposes, such as the oppression of racial
minorities.8 4 Thwarting those purposes has no social cost that is worth

&

81. Religious and other nonprofit tax exemptions work in this manner; while they marginally
increase the tax liability of individuals and for-profit businesses, the increase is spread across
taxpayers in the entire jurisdiction, and thus is relatively small. Cf Frederick Mark Gedicks
Andrew Koppelman, The Costs of the Public Good of Religion Should Be Borne by the Public, 67
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 185, 186-87 (distinguishing a taking of property with fair compensation
paid by tax dollars, from a taking without compensation, whose costs are entirely absorbed by the
expropriated landowner).
82. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990)(Scalia, J.,
concurring). On the other hand, he has never endorsed any doctrinal device for operationalizing
this requirement: if Equal Protection prohibits racial classifications (which Scalia would bar) and
nothing else, then the majority can impose nearly anything it likes on you and me. On the
limitations of Scalia's Equal Protection jurisprudence, see Andrew Koppelman, Why Scalia should
have votedto overturn DOMA, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 131, 146-152 (2013),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/12/LRColl2013nl2Koppelman.pdf.
83. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 82-83 (1980).
84. The Court has repeatedly explained: the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out"
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough
to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this
compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification
was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). See also Johnson v. California, 543
U.S. 499, 506 (2005) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326
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counting." Infringements of fundamental rights are generally suffered by
unpopular minorities as well: opinions that most people revile are the ones
most likely to be censored. In both these areas, the deployment of the
doctrine will sometimes thwart the government completely from doing what
it wants to do, but the cost of blocking the government is unlikely to be
concentrated on powerless minorities. Maybe the state won't be able to
devise another way to pursue whatever goal it was pursuing, but this
inaction is unlikely to be attributable to the powerlessness of some
minority. Hobby Lobby introduces a deployment of the least restrictive
means test that predictably leaves minorities vulnerable in precisely this
way.
The argument we have just set forth invites the objection that the Court
lacks the institutional means to predict the likelihood of political resistance
to any particular suggested less restrictive means.8 6 One response is that the
Justices do not hesitate to make such predictions when it suits their
purposes. In its first review of the ACA, for example, the Court held that
the ACA's threat to deprive states of existing Medicaid funding if they did
not participate in the proposed Medicaid expansion exceeded Congress's
spending power.8 7 Justice Ginsburg argued that this elevated form over
substance, because this condition was functionally equivalent to Congress's
repealing the existing Medicaid program, and then reenacting it with the
Medicaid expansion folded in-an action unquestionably within the limits
of the Spending Clause." Three Justices dismissed this argument out of
hand, pointing to the doubtful political viability of repealing and reenacting
Medicaid.8 9

&

(2003) (same); Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225 (1995) (same). With affirmative action, too,
the Court's use of least restrictive means analysis shows that the court regards some goals of
government, such as the prevention of all-black elementary schools, to be not worth pursuing at
all. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
85.
See Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality 13-56 (1996).
86. This objection was raised in conversation by Prof Thomas Berg.
87. National Fed. Indep. Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2636-39 (2012) (plurality
opinion of Roberts, C.J. joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2662-62 (joint dissent of Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.).
88. 132 S.Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part
dissenting in part).
89. 132 S.Ct. at 2606 n. 14 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added & internal citations deleted):
Justice Ginsburg suggests that the States can have no objection to the Medicaid expansion,
because "Congress could have repealed Medicaid [and t]hereafter . . . could have enacted
Medicaid II, a new program combining the pre-2010 coverage with the expanded coverage
required by the ACA." But it would certainly not be that easy. Practical constraints would plainly
inhibit, if not preclude, the Federal Government from repealing the existing program and putting
every feature of Medicaid on the table for political reconsideration. Such a massive undertaking
would hardly be "ritualistic."
In a conversation with Prof Koppelman, former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle
suggested that if Congress, tried to reenact Medicaid in the way that Justice Ginsburg suggested,
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But even if the objection is sound, the Court should not remain
oblivious to the problem of the "politically improbable" least restrictive
means. Pre-RFRA free exercise law avoided the difficulty by not invoking a
less restrictive means that would have demanded new legislative action to
avoid third-party burdens. A per se rule against such a demand would
avoid the problem without requiring courts to make these difficult political
judgments.
V. "STATUTORY INTERPRETATION" AS
A RATIONALIZATION FOR OLIGARCHY

Perhaps it is because Hobby Lobby is a statutory interpretation case that
in it the Court abandons the judicial restraint that guided its constitutional
interpretation in Smith. The situation created by the Court's creative and
surprising reinterpretation of RFRA invites comparison with the Court's
deployment of the category of "traditional governmental functions." The
Court experimented with that category as the basis for a constitutional rule
restraining the imposition of federal law on the states: these functions were
immune from federal regulations such as the minimum wage.9 0 The rule
eventually was abandoned as "unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice," because the rule invited the judiciary "to make decisions about
which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." 9 1 But it later
revived it as a presumption of statutory interpretation: federal statutes will
not be construed to alter the "usual constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government" unless Congress's intention is
"unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."92 This presumption has
then been applied retroactively to statutes which were enacted before the
Court announced it.
The rule of Gregory is one of a number of techniques of statutory
distortion that the Court has deployed in recent years. These include
wrenching terms out of context in order to contradict the statute's purpose,
relying on presumptions that are so strong that they defeat express statutory
language, aggressive use of preemption doctrine to defeat state regulatory
laws that Congress had no intention of disturbing, devising new interpretive
approaches and applying them retroactively to laws already in existence,
and minimizing the effect of corrective legislation that overrides the Court's
misinterpretations.9 Hobby Lobby is best understood as standing in this

some members of Congress would reopen the question of how the funds are allocated, generating
huge political difficulties. See Koppelman, The Tough Luck Constitution and the Assault on
Health Care Reform, at 168 n. 22.
90. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
91. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985).
92. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
93.
Simon Lazarus, Stripping the Gears of National Government: Justice Stevens's Stand
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tradition, using vague legislative language as an opportunity to craft a new
statutory scheme that is radically at variance with what Congress had in
mind.
This pattern sheds important light on the ongoing debate about whether
legislative history is a legitimate source of law in statutory interpretation. A
legal movement led by Justice Scalia, called "the new textualism,"
professes that judges should be guided solely by the meaning of the
language of the Constitution and statutes when they were laid down.9 4
In interpreting statutes, Scalia rejects the use of legislative history
because it is manipulable - like "entering a crowded cocktail party and
looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends."9 5 There will always
be so many bits of legislative history that one can cherrypick the results that
one likes, and individual legislators can insert statements into the record
declaring intentions that were never agreed to by Congress as a whole or the
President. This objection imagines a particularly gullible use of legislative
history, in which such statements are given the same weight as a conference
committee report. The solution is a mighty broad one: excluding all
information about the legislative history.
If - it is a big if - the purpose of the new textualism is to limit judicial
discretion, then it is a failure. In practice, when freed from the need to pay
any attention to what Congress was actually trying to do, the Court has been
empowered to manipulate a law's language to reach politically congenial
results. The fewer the sources of law, the more ambiguity and therefore the
more discretion. It is like keeping a bouncer outside the cocktail party to
keep out anybody one prefers not to chat with.
Legislative history in practice constrainsjudges. A survey of more than
thirty years of Supreme Court labor law opinions found that when
legislative history was relied upon, judges were more likely to vote against
their ideological preferences - with Democrat-appointed judges voting in
favor of employer interests, and Republican-appointed judges voting in
favor of worker interests. Since Scalia joined the Court, the diminishing
reliance on legislative history has been accompanied by increasingly proemployer results.9 6
Hobby Lobby is an illustration of this new empowerment of judges. It

Against Judicial Subversion of Progressive Laws and Lawmaking, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 769
(2012).
94.
See William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (1990).
95. Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
377 (2012).
96. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices' Reliance on Legislative History:
Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 117 (2008). For
elaboration on the weaknesses of the new textualism, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism andNormative Canons, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 531 (2013).
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doesn't even make sense at the level of textualism. As noted earlier,
legislative findings in the text of RFRA make clear that its purpose is to
restore the pre-Smith balancing test. But Hobby Lobby is radically at odds
with this statutory statement of purpose. It reaches a result that would have
astonished Congress.
If legislative history is in fact a constraint upon judges, then the
campaign to ignore legislative history can be understood as a prescription
for liberating judges from it. The removal of this source of law introduces
ambiguity into areas of law where there otherwise would be none. Judges
are then free to resolve such ambiguities in politically congenial ways. They
are more likely to defy Congress's obvious intentions when they have
reason to be confident that Congress will not be able to intervene.97 And
they accomplish this by a technique that is paraded as evidence of their
superior virtue and restraint.98
CONCLUSION

If government refusals to accommodate are viewed with the kind of
skepticism that the Court displays in Hobby Lobby, then claims of
accommodation will nearly always be supported by some imaginable less
restrictive means, even if its enactment is politically impossible. The
consequence in practice will be an interpretation of religious liberty in
which adherents get to harm nonadherents, in which some are force to pay
for the religious exercise of others. Religious liberty here would mean the
right to impose your religion on other people who don't share your views.
This activism sits uneasily beside the conspicuous judicial restraint of
Smith. The Court can, and sometimes does, say that its interpretation of a
statute is vindicated by the fact that Congress has let its decision stand. But
changing statutory law isn't easy. The Court craves democratic
legitimation, but evidently bogus legitimation will do.
One of the principal attractions of the idea of religious liberty has
always been that the exercise of one person's religion doesn't hurt anyone
else. In Thomas Jefferson's classic formulation: "it does me no injury for
my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my
pocket nor breaks my leg." 99 But paying for contraceptives that should be

97.
See Paul Stancil, Congressional Silence and the Statutory Interpretation Game, 54 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1251, 1263-65, 1324, 1332-36 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court will
often take advantage of the high transaction costs of enacting federal legislation to engage in selfinterested or aggressive interpretations of federal statutes without fear of congressional override).
98. On Scalia's uses of this rhetorical move, see Andrew Koppelman, Passive Aggressive:
Scalia and Garner on Interpretation, 41 Boundary 2: an international journal of literature and
culture 227 (Summer 2014).
99. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in Writings 285 (Merrill D. Peterson
ed., 1984).
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covered by insurance is exactly like having one's pocket picked, while
involuntary pregnancy is worse than a broken leg.
The Court evidently thinks that it is helping the cause of religious
liberty by construing RFRA very broadly. It may have lost sight of the fact
that RFRA is a statutory accommodation, and Hobby Lobby is a mere
statutory interpretation that Congress has the power to undo. The existence
and vitality of RFRA-and other statutory accommodations of religionultimately depends on the sufferance of Congress and the voters who elect
it. How likely is it that those voters will support religious claims that
manifestly hurt innocent people, or pay in perpetuity to subsidize religious
practices they do not share and may find politically or morally repugnant?
Religion has been a great force for good in the world,"oo but it is hard to see
that when this is its most prominent manifestation. If this is the official
meaning of religious liberty, than the broad acceptance of religious liberty

will fade.
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